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Abstract
The death of an artist constitutes a negative supply shock to his future produc-
tion; in finance terms, this supply shock reduces the artist’s float. Intuition may
thus suggest that this supply shock reduces the future auction volume of the artist.
However, if collectors have fluctuating heterogeneous beliefs, since they cannot sell
short, prices overweigh optimists’ beliefs and have a speculative component. If
collectors have limited capacity to bear risk, an increase in float may decrease sub-
sequent turnover and prices (Hong et al., 2006). Symmetrically, a negative supply
shock leads to an augmentation of prices and turnover. We find strong support for
this prediction in the data on art auctions that we examine.
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Pour moi les tableaux de grand prix
Sont ceux que plus cher on m’achète.
Après tout, que m’importe le talent? 1
I. Introduction
Around 1660, an Italian art dealer brought bad news to Rembrandt: his style of painting
was no longer in vogue and sold at lower prices. Rembrandt did not yield to the art
dealer’s suggestion to start painting in the idealizing style of the classic painters, but
thought up a cunning plan. He disappeared and had the rumor spread that he had died
(De Wilt, 2006). As a consequence, works by a ‘dead’ Rembrandt were sold for up to
three times the normal price.2
This anecdote illustrates that the unexpected death of an artist leads to higher prices,
a natural consequence of the lower future supply relative to expectations. It is natural to
expect that the lower supply would also lead to a smaller volume of trade in the future
but theories of speculation based on fluctuating differences in beliefs and short-selling
restrictions (Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) suggest that the
lower outstanding supply may actually lead to an increase in both prices and turnover
(Hong et al. 2006). A smaller float means that the marginal future buyer is likely to
have a more optimistic view, which makes the option to sell more valuable for the current
owner. When the marginal future buyer is more optimistic, it is also less probable that
a current owner’s valuation will stay among the highest in the future leading to a higher
1“For me, highly priced paintings are those that I can sell ever more expensively. After all, why
should I care about talent?” Quote from Forbeck, the art-dealer in the play “Rembrandt ou la Vente
après décès” (by Charles-Guillaume Etienne, 1777-1845) (see Spieth 2017).
2Several versions of this anecdote circulate. The aforementioned play has been performed in France
since 1800. According to the play, Rembrandt and his first wife Saskia van Uylenburgh conspired:
Rembrandt left Amsterdam for a while, Saskia spread the rumor that her husband had died and dressed
in traditional mourning clothing. As a consequence, the demand for Rembrandt’s paintings and etchings
surged and the ‘widow’ sold many, while remarking that there would be no new supply of Rembrandts
(De Wilt, 2006). After a while, Rembrandt reappeared. In a different context, a similar anecdote was
told: As a consequence of his bankruptcy, all his work was auctioned to pay off creditors. Prior to the
auction, Rembrandt faked his death to increase the proceeds from the sales.
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average turnover.3
In this paper we use a database of sales of modern and contemporary art at auction
to evaluate the impact of an unexpected death of an artist. Since we do not observe the
counterfactual evolution of an artists’ oeuvre had she not died, we match an artist who
died prematurely and suddenly with an artist who lived for at least 10 years after the
death of the treated artist and who is otherwise similar or close in birth-year, and number
of auctioned paintings, price level, and reputation over a ten-year look-back period prior
to the death of the treated artist. We define death as premature if it takes place at an
age of 65 or earlier (we perform sensitivity analyses on this age cutoff), and sudden if it is
attributed to a heart attack, stroke, accident, murder, suicide, overdose, etc., information
that we collect from obituaries, biographies, newspaper articles and other media sources.
Our database of treated artists counts 246 cases of premature and sudden deaths out of
2,236 artists who were alive at the beginning of our sample period. We identify 57,997
auction transactions for the combined subsamples of treated and matched artists.
Our empirical results lead to five conclusions. First, premature death increases prices
by 54.7% and sales by 63.2%. Second, if the death is also sudden, price and volume
increases amount to 80.0% and 84.0%, respectively. Third, the death effect is more
pronounced when the artist dies at a younger age, when she presumably leaves a larger
un-produced body of work. Fourth, for death to have an impact on prices and sales,
the artist needs to have a reputation, otherwise there is no effect. All these findings
are confirmed by robustness tests on the definition of premature death and of an artist’s
notoriety, and with different samples (matched artists’ sample, all artists’ in the global
database). A placebo test reassuringly shows that the death effect in a pseudo dataset
is insignificant. Fifth, death has a permanent impact for 10 years and beyond on prices
and volume in our diff-in-diff setup, which we confirm using event study designs and a
repeat-sales analysis. Following Pénasse and Renneboog (2018), we use the number of
transactions observed each year (trading volume) to proxy for auction turnover. Since an
3Mei et al. (2009) and Xiong and Yu (2011) document the negative cross-sectional correlation between
turnover and float during two speculative episodes in Chinese markets.
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artist’s unexpected death necessarily diminishes supply, the increase in trading volume
we document implies an even larger increase in turnover relative to the counterfactual.
While popular wisdom claims that a dead artist is worth more than one alive, the
impact of death on art transactions and prices have not been studied often.4 In the
traditional hedonic regressions that aim at constructing art-indexes, some papers include
a dummy variable indicating that an artist is dead at the time of the transaction (see
e.g., Ekelund et al. 2000; Ursprung and Wiermann 2011; Renneboog and Spaenjers 2013).
These studies all conclude that death is accompanied by higher average prices.5 While
not controlling for unexpected deaths, Korteweg et al. (2016) document that paintings
do not sell more frequently subsequent to an artist’s demise, “despite popular belief that
the passing away of an artist temporarily raises visibility of his or her artwork”. The
authors speculate that this is because “most artists’ deaths do not come as a surprise to
the market”.
The price increase following unexpected death is compatible with any theory in which
supply affects prices, and a temporary volume increase could be a consequence of the price
increase, since the current holders of the art-works of the deceased artist may decide to
consume some of the capital gains or simply to rebalance their portfolios. If auctions of
individual works are subject to fixed costs, an increase in price could affect sales volume.
However, our results on volume stand even after we add a control for yearly-average sale
price of an artist’s works. The observed permanent increase in volume is more difficult
to explain by alternative theories and gives support to the hypothesis that theories of
speculation based on fluctuating differences in beliefs and short-selling restrictions apply
to the art-market.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section II we detail our
4The impact of supply-elasticity in speculative episodes in housing markets is modeled and docu-
mented in Glaeser et al. (2008).
5Our approach differs from these studies by its focus on premature and sudden deaths. In addition,
our research design relies on the set up of a matched control group. A control group effectively pins
down the counterfactual price and volume trajectories in the absence of premature and sudden death. In
the absence of a matched sample, the control group consists of all non-treated artists. It is likely these
artists exhibit different price and volume trajectories as they age, which would contaminate the estimate
of the death effect. Our research design minimizes this risk by constructing a matched sample.
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datasets and develop the empirical strategy and econometric considerations; in Section
III we present the results and explain the robustness and placebo tests; and in Section IV,
we formulate our conclusion. In Appendix A we present a simple model of speculation
between risk-neutral agents where the premature death of an artist leads to a permanent
increase in prices and turnover of her art-works.6
II. Data and empirical strategy
A. The Art Market
The setting for our empirical work is the auction market for modern and contemporary
art. Works of art are usually sold through two types of intermediaries, dealers (galleries)
and auction houses. Auction houses effectively act as brokers and operate most of the
secondary market for art and other luxury goods. According to the Tefaf Art Market
Report 2017, the art market is worth about USD 45 billion worldwide, typically split
equally between dealers and auction houses (Pownall, 2017). Dealers are often small
businesses, lightly regulated, so that this market is largely opaque. As a result, dealer
prices tend not to be reliable or easily obtainable. We therefore work with auction
data, which aligns well with our interest in the secondary market. Auction data is both
reliable and publicly available, and has been used to study a broad number of finance and
economics questions (e.g. Beggs and Graddy (2009), Galenson and Weinberg (2000), Mei
and Moses (2005)). A drawback is that fewer artists are active on the auction market
at the time of their death. This means that we can only measure the effect of death on
prices conditional on the death of artists for whom there is a secondary market.
The way the auction market operates has changed little over the centuries. Sellers
consign works of art to an auction house and works are grouped to create an auction.
Every auction comes with a catalog listing all of the lots in the sale with information
6Bernales et al. (2019) also study a model featuring risk-averse agents with heterogeneous beliefs, in
which a reduction in supply leads to an increase in volume. Lovo and Spaenjers (2018) propose a model
where trading also arises endogenously, but do not study the effect of a change in supply.
5
about each piece and often features a public pre-sale exhibition. At the auction itself,
each item is bid on, one at a time. When an item does not attract any bids or the bids
do not exceed the reserve price, it is bought-in. If it is sold, the winner is required to pay
the hammer price along with the buyer’s commission and any taxes. The auction house
also takes a seller’s commission, which is deducted from the hammer price, and passes on
the remainder of the proceeds to the consignor.
Transaction costs are substantial in the art market. Auction houses typically charge
commissions of around 10% for both parties (buyers and sellers), and transaction costs
may also include mandatory insurance and shipping charges (see Pesando (1993), Ashen-
felter and Graddy (2003)). If a lot does not sell, consignors often face “buy-back” fees,
reimbursing the auction house for its various costs, such as photographing, researching
and cataloging the item. Sellers also incur some charges, such as shipping and handling
costs even when a work of art goes unsold (i.e., it is “bought-in”). Art buyers also have to
take into account the various costs incurred to maintain, store, restore and insure works
of art, which can be non-negligible.
Despite these large transaction costs, art-as-investment is increasingly popular. The
first formal art fund was one launched by the British Rail Pension Fund in 1974, investing
some $70 million worth of art and luxury furniture (Trucco, 1989). The Art & Finance
Report 2014, a joint report by Deloitte Luxembourg and ArtTactic, identifies 72 art
funds in operation in 2014. Art funds are of course only the tip of the art investment
iceberg. 76 percent of art buyers still view their acquisitions as investments, intending
to at least avoid negative returns (Picinati di Torcello and Petterson, 2014). There are
about 300,000 art advisors in the world today (Reyburn, 2014).
Equally interesting is the practice of flipping art. Art flippers purchase art with
the intent of offering the piece at a profit shortly after purchase. Flipping is facilitated
by specialized firms offering high-security warehouses, in tax-free jurisdictions, specially
designed for the purpose of quickly reselling art. For example, a 2015 New York Times
Magazine article covers a new storage company, Uovo (Alden, 2015): “Everything about
the facility seems designed to remove friction from the art market—to turn physical
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objects into liquid assets. Apart from its private viewing rooms for deal making, which
are now common in the storage business, what really sets Uovo apart is its vast database.
[. . . ] [G]iving clients and prospective buyers remote access to so much data, while making
the business more efficient, also helps make the art more like a tradable unit, able to
change hands without even leaving a warehouse.7
B. Auction data
Our primary data sources are the Blouin Art Sales database and Auction club, online
databases commonly used in research on art-markets. In the Blouin database, we retain
a million auction records from 1957 until 2016, for 8,199 artists, covering art periods from
Medieval art to Modern and Contemporary art. The selected artists also appear in the
Oxford Grove online Dictionary and/or in Artcyclopedia. Only London sales are included
until 1969, but from the 1970s, the coverage consists of almost all major, medium-sized,
and even smaller auction houses around the world. We restrict our attention to 2,051
artists who were alive in 1957, the beginning of our sample period. We expand the
universe of contemporary artists using various sources (mostly from lists complied by
Wikipedia), and obtain additional transactions from the data provider Auction club.
This additional search yields transactions for 866 artists including 185 that were not in
our initial dataset and were alive at the start of our sample window. Our final sample
thus comprise 2,236 artists.
This paper focuses on 246 artists who passed away prematurely and no later than
2015. This enables us to observe transactions at least one year before and one year after
the death of the artist. We consider a death as premature if it occurs prior to an artist’s
66th birthday (we later explore the sensitivity of our results to this cutoff). On average,
these artists died at age 54.
7Buying art as an investment is not a recent phenomenon. The noted collector Peggy Guggenheim
wrote after a visit to New York in 1959 that “[T]he entire art movement had become an enormous
business venture,... Some buy merely for investment, placing pictures in storage without even seeing
them, phoning their gallery every day for the latest quotation, as though they were waiting to sell stock
at the most advantageous moment.” Guggenheim (1997), page 78.
7
The relatively young average age of decease suggests that premature death may have
suppressed a substantial body of work. To provide a rough estimate of the size of the
anticipated oeuvre which was not produced as a result of premature death, we again use
Blouin Art Sales data and select the sample of painters who were born after 1880 (and
hence active in the 20th century), lived to at least age 70, and had at least 200 sales in
auctions from 1957 to 2016.8 On average, each painter had 605 sales but Blouin provides
year-of-production for only 255 of these. The painters in this sample created, on average,
129 paintings before and including the age of 54 and 126 paintings subsequently. Hence
we can reasonably argue that the average prematurely deceased artist that we focus on
in this paper produced only half of their potential oeuvre.
The “death events” are spread over the sample period. A group of nine artists passed
away in 1958, while the last two artists died in 2013. This is convenient from an econo-
metric point of view, because it reduces the risk that our results may be driven by the
state of the market at a narrow point in time (Figure 1).
Whenever possible, we collect the cause of death of artists who passed away at the
age of 65 or younger. We gather this biographical information from a combination of
obituaries, biographical memoirs, newspaper articles, magazine articles, and encyclope-
dia (including Grove Dictionary of Art/Oxford Art Online and Wikipedia), in order to
ascertain the surprise element in an artist’s death. We report statistics on causes of death
in Table I.
Each auction record contains information on the artist, artwork, and sale. We observe
the name of the artist, his nationality, and his or her years of birth and death. Even in
public sales, the identity of the buyer and the seller are typically kept secret by the
auction house, and our dataset does not contain this information. The information on
the art object includes title, year of creation (for about a third of observations), medium,
size, and whether the piece is signed. The transaction information includes the auction
house, date of the auction, lot number, and hammer price. Our sample includes periods
8Although catalogue raisonnés would provide more complete data, they only exist for a small number
of artists.
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of large inflation and we calculate 2015 US dollar equivalent hammer prices using the US
consumer price index.
Our main variables of interest are auction prices and trading volume around death
events. Few artists sell at auction every year, and many artists only sell when they reach
a certain level of notoriety. Each year-artist for which we do not observe a transaction is
recorded as a zero, provided the artist is aged 23 or older.9 Our volume panel consists
of 124,273 artist-year volume observations, of which 26,865 correspond to the treated
artists and their matched controls. Estimating the death effect on art prices imposes an
additional condition, since we need to observe at least one transaction before and after
the death of the artist. To measure the impact on prices, we thus rely on a subset of 76
artists who were active on the auction market before their death.
C. Empirical strategy
We ask whether premature death affects two outcome variables, volume and prices. A
natural starting point is to examine whether the price and traded volume of a deceased
artist change after the artist passes away. Our hypothesis is that, everything else equal,
prices and volume should increase. That is, we are interested in the counterfactual price
and volume trajectory of the same artist if she would not have passed away prematurely.
In Appendix A, we formalize this hypothesis in a stylized model. Since both prices and
volume may correlate with age, as well as the passage of time, our specifications must
include not only artist fixed effects, but also age and time fixed effects. In particular, age
fixed effects are set irrespective of whether the artist is alive or not at the time of the
transaction, because they serve the purpose of separately identifying the effect of death
from the effect of age. Even with such a rich set of fixed effects, it is important to reflect
on what control group will serve to pin down the counterfactual prices and volume in the
absence of premature death. When the sample only includes the works of artists who
passed away prematurely, we cannot separately identify the effect of death from the effect
9We set the beginning of an artist’s career at the age of 23, which corresponds to the earliest sale in
an artist’s career (Jean-Michel Basquiat) in our sample.
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of old age. In our baseline specification, since the age cutoff of premature death is 65
years, the age fixed effects for ages exceeding 65 capture both the effect of age and the
effect of death. Separating the effect of death from the effect of age therefore requires the
presence of a control group of artists who did not die prematurely. Because artists may
experience different career paths—the effect of age may be different across artists—it is
a priori important to construct a control group that is as close as possible to the group
of treated artists.
Our preferred empirical strategy therefore relies on constructing a synthetic control
group of artists that is very similar to the group of treated artists. We implement a
matching procedure to construct a control group of artists who are most comparable to
the group of 246 artists that died prematurely. We delineate a set of covariates along
which matched artists must resemble each other. The control group must consist of
artists of approximately the same age as the “treated” group, selling art in the auction
market in the same quantity and price range. We also want that the degree of notoriety
of the treated and matched artists are comparable. We then implement a variation on the
coarsened exact matching procedure (Iacus et al., 2012) to identify the artists that best
satisfy these criteria. This procedure is similar to the identification strategy used by, e.g.,
Azoulay et al. (2010) to estimate the effect of “superstar” scientists on the productivity
of their collaborators.
To construct our synthetic control group, we first match artists based on the average
real USD price commanded by the artist’s work and the average number of artworks sold
per year. Both variables are measured over a lookback period of at most ten years before
the death of the treated artist. We distinguish cases where the artist’s work has been
auctioned prior to his death, to cases in which no work of the artist has been sold prior
to his death. For artists with prior sales, we search for other artists for which both past
sales and prices fall within a 50% range of the treated artist. We match the remaining
individuals without prior sales to other artists without prior sales. In the absence of price
information, we check that the reputation of the treated artists and those in the control
sample are similar at the time of death of the treated artist. To do so, following Pénasse
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and Renneboog (2018), we measure the yearly “Fame” of the artist as the percentage of
mentions of each artist name in the English-language books digitized by Google Books.
We require that the control artist’s Fame in the year of the death of the treated artist,
winsorized at the 5% level, falls within a 50% range of the treated artist Fame.10
Third, we require that a matched artist is born no more than ten years before or after
the treated artist and that the matched artist is presently alive or passed away at age
of 66 or older and at least ten years after the treated artist. This ensures that matched
artists belong approximately to the same age cohort, while at the same time they do not
die prematurely, so that we can identify the effect of the treated artist’s death. We match
without replacement so that each artist is assigned exactly one match. Whenever more
than one match is found, we pick the matches that minimize the (normalized) Euclidean
distance in the year of births of the two artists, sales, and price at death or fame. If several
matches satisfy this last distance criterion, we pick one at random.11 As an example, the
algorithm matches Eva Hesse, one of the pioneers of post-minimalism, who died in 1970
at age 34, with Frank Stella (1936-) a major American artist of the 20th century, who is
still active. In an online appendix, we show the list of artists and their matches.
Finally, we note that while our design aims at capturing the causal effect of death, we
are interested in capturing the effect of the realized supply. This requires two additional
assumptions. First, premature death must affect treated artists but not their controls.
We later construct a placebo test that allow us to check that assumption. Second, death
has to leave the demand for the artist unchanged. For instance, death must not boost the
artist’s (unobserved) notoriety. We consider a series of proxies for notoriety and return
to this question in Section III.F.
Our control selection procedure matches 242 of the 246 treated artists (98.37%). We
have a total of 57,997 transactions for these artists and the control group. Table II
provides summary statistics for the variables of interest for the sample of artists who
died prematurely and their matched counterparts. Statistics on average real USD prices,
10Google nGram data is unavailable after 2008; for artists that died after that, we take Fame in 2008.
11We also considered a simpler procedure where we minimize the Euclidean distance for the vector of
standardized matching variables and obtained similar regression results.
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average yearly volume and fame are computed for both samples of artists, based on the
years before the death event of the treated artists. Fame is standardized so that the cross
section of all artists in a given year has a zero mean and unit standard deviation. Both
treated and control artists are, by construction, well balanced on all covariates relating to
age, past prices, and volume. The typical artist in our sample is born in the mid-1920s.
Treated artists pass away at the age of 54.3 on average, which is 22.7 years younger
than the typical control (conditional on the later artist dying before 2016). There is
considerable variation in the age, and time, of death. For instance, the youngest artist
in our sample, Francesca Woodman, died in 1981 at the age of 23; 17 passed away at the
age of 65. On average, treated and matched artists sold one work through auction per
year in the ten years that preceded their death. 170 artists had not sold a single work of
art at the time of their death; also in this respect, matched artists are very similar.12
D. Econometric Considerations
We use a difference-in-differences framework to estimate the impact of death on prices
and volume. Our econometric specification differs slightly depending on whether the
outcome variable is price or trading volume. For the former, our specification is







where Pitk denotes the auction price of artwork k for artist i in year t, PostDeath is
an indicator variable that switches to one from the artist’s death year if the artist dies
before 65, αi and δt are artist and year fixed effects, Agei,t corresponds to age brackets
dummies in five-year intervals, and Artworki,t,k is a vector of artwork-specific controls
that affect the price of art. This vector includes observed characteristics such as whether
a given work is signed, whether it is dated, the medium (oil, watercolor, etc.), size,
and auction house dummy variables. The vector Artisti,t includes artist characteristics
12Although our sample contains both superstars and lesser known artists, Table II does not suggest
that outliers may be present. We nevertheless verified that our results do not change when we winsorize
prices and volume or drop the most traded artists.
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reflecting the fact that artist notoriety may change over time. To proxy for notoriety, we
create a dummy variable equal to one when the artist has exhibited at the Documenta
exhibition in Cassel, and another equal to one when the artist’s work has been sold at
Sotheby’s or Christie’s main venues, in London or New York. We also report regression
results controlling for ‘Fame’, as defined above, since the variable is only available on
a shorter sample (up to 2008). Equations of the form of (1) are often referred to as
“hedonic regressions” in the literature on the determinants of real estate and art prices
(e.g., Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2013).
To estimate the impact of death on the number of artworks sold Vi,t for artist i in
year t, we use the following specification, which is commonly used for count data with
many zeros:
E[Vi,t|Zi,t] = exp[β0 + β1PostDeathi,t + αi + δt + γ′1Agei,t + γ′3Artisti,t], (2)
where all variables are defined as above (Zi,t includes all right-hand side variables in
Equation (2)). In both instances, a positive β1 indicates that artists command higher
prices or volume on average after their death. We estimate the effect of death on prices in
(1) by OLS. In Equation (2) where the dependent variable is volume with a large number
of zeros, we present conditional quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimates of the fixed
effects Poisson model (Hausman et al., 1984). In both cases, we compute standard errors
using the generalized Huber-White formula clustered at the artist level. QML standard
errors are consistent even if the underlying data generating process is not Poisson, as long
as Equation (2) is the correct specification of the conditional mean (Cameron and Trivedi,
1998). Bertrand et al. (2004) show that these “cluster-robust” standard errors perform
well in the context of Differences-in-Differences estimation similars to our setting.
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III. Results
A. Main effect of premature death
Table III gives the resulting β1-estimates. The top panel reports the impact of death
on auction prices and the bottom panel reports the effect on trading volume. The first
column of each panel gives the results including the control group of matched artists,
whereas the second column of each panel shows the results for the treated artists only.
The table reports the number of observations as well as the number of treated artists and
the number of control artists, if any. Observe that the number of artists is smaller in the
top panel. We measure the impact of death on prices for the 76 artists who were active
on the auction market before their death. In the bottom panel, we can work with the
full sample of 246 artists.
Overall we find that both prices and volume surge when an artist passes away prema-
turely. In our baseline specification that includes the control group (column 1), we find
that prices increase by exp(0.436) − 1 = 54.7%. Likewise, volume increases by 63.2%.
All estimates are highly significant. The effect is practically the same for volume and
are smaller but in the same magnitude for prices when we exclude artists of the control
group.
The price and volume elasticities implicit in Table III, together with our estimate that
the premature death of our treated artists caused a halving of their float (compared to the
output of artists who did not die prematurely), allows us to calculate the elasticities with
respect to float of price and volume that are displayed in Table IV. In turn, these imply an
elasticity of price with respect to turnover of .46. This back-of-the-envelope calculation
yields a result that is not far from the point estimate of .38 obtained by Cochrane (2003)
for the elasticity of price-to-book with respect to float for Nasdaq stocks during the
internet-bubble month of December 1999 or the elasticity of the price of warrants with
respect to float for the data in Xiong and Yu (2011) (.24).
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B. Robustness
We check the robustness of our main findings in Tables V to VII. Our results stay the
same when using the full sample of artists alive in 1957 (Table V): their premature
decease lead to both higher prices and volume, which respectively increase by 51.4% and
61.4%. The death of an artist can have an impact on his visibility and thus, on collectors’
willingness to pay, which is why we repeat the above analyses while while controlling for
an alternative definition of notoriety based on the Fame variable. The Fame variable, as
defined earlier, is the percentage of mentions of each artist name in the English-language
books digitized by Google Books.13 The coefficients remain highly significant and effects
are of similar magnitude. Finally, in Table VII, we perform a placebo test by dropping
all treated artists and by “treating” their matched controls. To this placebo population
of artists, who exhibit the same characteristics as the actually treated artists, we assign a
placebo date of death that corresponds to the date of the premature death of the matched
artists. We then match these these artists, who are assigned a placebo premature death
date, with a new group of control artists and estimate the death effect on this placebo
group.14 Reassuringly, Table VII indicates that the death effect in this pseudo dataset
on prices and volume is small and insignificant.
C. Sensitivity of sudden death, premature decease, and artist fame
In Table VIII, we drop all artists for whom death could have been anticipated. We ex-
pect the effect of death to be stronger in that case. We gather biographical information
through a combination of the following resources: obituaries, biographical memoirs, artist
biographies on auction websites, gallery descriptions, newspaper articles, magazine arti-
cles, and Google searches (including Wikipedia articles). We classify premature deaths
as sudden, when the death is indicated as sudden in obituaries or news articles, or when
the cause of death is given as a hearth attack, stroke (for artists with no reported heart
13The results in Table VI are based on the shorter sample of artists for which Fame is available in the
year of death, but same results hold if we use 2008 Fame for artists that died after 2008.
14We match the large majority of artists, yielding a sample only slightly smaller of 69 (235) treated
artists in the price (volume) specification.
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disease), accident, murder, suicide,15 overdose, sudden disease, and complication from
surgery. Deaths are classified as anticipated whenever our source mentions that an artist
was ill or in fragile condition. Table VIII indicates that prices and volume increase 80.0%
and 84.0% upon unexpected death. As expected, these estimates are larger than our
baseline estimates, so that the effect of premature death on prices and volume is larger
when death is unexpected.16
We next explore the sensitivity of our result to the 65 year age cutoff. Death con-
stitutes a shock to the future production of the artist. The shock is larger when the
artist leaves a larger un-produced body of work, that is when the artist dies young. We
therefore expect the death effect to be stronger for younger artists. Besides, death is less
likely to be expected when it occurs at prime age, which should also contribute to the
effect being larger for younger artists. In Figure 2, we report the coefficients for the effect
of death interacted by the age of the treated artist, for age cutoffs from 50 and below to
ages exceeding 90. The sample includes all artists who are alive at the beginning of our
sample period (1957), as in Table V. Figure 2 confirms our prediction. The death effect
declines with age as expected. The price effect is insignificant at the 95% level from the
age of 65 onwards; the effect on volume turns insignificant from the age of 80.
We also expect that the death effect would matter mainly for artists who have already
achieved a certain degree of reputation. In order to analysis the impact of fame at the
time of death, we split the sample of artists with higher and lower notoriety (as measured
by Fame). The left/right column in Table IX shows results for artist whose Fame is
within the top/bottom tercile at the year of their death. We find that the results are
driven by artists with a higher degree of notoriety, whereas there is no significant price
and volume impact for less reputable artists.
Finally, to examine the possibility that the volume results are a consequence of the
results on prices, perhaps because the presence of fixed costs lead to art pieces being
15One exception is Keith Vaughan’s suicide, which was preceded by a diagnosed cancer two years
before his death.
16The results are similar when we also drop potentially endogenous deaths such as suicides and over-
doses, although the sample becomes much smaller.
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present in auctions only when their prices are above a threshold. To capture that possi-
bility, we construct artist-level price indices by interacting artists and year fixed effects
in a hedonic regression:
logPi,t,k = β0 + δi,t + γ
′
2Artworki,t,k + εitk, (3)
Coefficients δi,t in this regression correspond to the average log price of same-quality
works sold for each artist-year. We next run Equation (2) while controlling for our
(log) artist price indices. Note that, as in Eq. (1), we can only work with the smaller
sample of artists that had an active auction-market by the time of their death. Further,
even for this smaller subset of artists, there are some years with zero-volume, for which
prices are not observed. In this case, we linearly interpolate to get continuous series (we
find similar results if we do not interpolate). Table X shows the impact of death on
volume, once we control for average prices. The coefficient associated with average-prices
is significantly positive, implying that there is indeed a positive partial price-volume
correlation. Nevertheless, the β1 coefficient retains statistical significance and is about
the same as our baseline estimate.17 This result indicates that the volume death-effect is
not a consequence of the price increases after death.
D. Persistence
We also study the dynamics of the death effect, which is particularly important for
volume if we want to separate the change-in-supply channel from a possible portfolio-
rebalancing channel. Collectors may decide to sell some of the deceased artist work after
this work increased in value, for instance because of the associated wealth effect. Portfolio
rebalancing would therefore cause volume to increase after death. But in contrast to
the death effect we are interested in, this effect should be short-lived since portfolio
rebalancing is only necessary once. In contrast, the supply effect predicts a permanent
17If we use the smaller sample but exclude the price index controls, the β1 estimates are slightly higher,
as expected (0.544 with the control group and 0.467 without).
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effect on volume, because the change in float is permanent.
We estimate a variant of Equations (1)-(2) as we interact the treatment effect with
indicator variables corresponding to a particular year relative to the artist’s death. To
reduce noise, we pool observations by year for each year within a five-year period before
and a ten-year period after the artist’s death. More concretely, the β1 coefficient is
replaced by a 15×1 vector and the PostDeath indicator is decomposed into 15 dummy
variables. The first dummy is equal to one for observations up to five year prior to
a treated artist death; the second dummy equals one for four years prior to a treated
artist death, etc. The year prior death is left out. The final dummy is equal to one for
observations 10 years or later after the passing away of the artist. Figure 3 suggests that
the death effect is permanent, as reflected by the point estimates and the 95% confidence
interval around them (Panels (a) and (b) correspond to columns 1 in Panels A and B in
Table III). We observe a sharp increase in both prices and volume on the year following
death. The point estimates are all insignificant in the pre-treatment years and are all
positive (mostly significant) for all years after the death of the artist.18
E. Evidence using round-trip transaction data
So far our estimates of the price impact have been based on different items auctioned
at different periods. As is common in the literature on art and real estate, we rely on
the objective “hedonic” characteristics of the auctioned items to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. We can also estimate the death effect using observations for the same item,
provided such item has been auctioned at least twice. This is useful, because it enables
us to work directly with returns, rather than prices.
Consider an item bought in time t and sold in time t + j. Taking the difference of
Equation (1) yields
logPi,t+j,k−logPi,t,k = β1(PostDeathi,t+j−PostDeathi,t)+(Xi,t+j,t−Xi,t,t)γ+δt+j−δt+εi,t,t+j.
18We also find no evidence of extrapolative behavior, e.g. Barberis et al. (2018), as a result of death
of an artist although extrapolation is most probably present in art markets (see Pénasse and Renneboog
2018).
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The left-hand side variable is now the round-trip log return between times t and t + j.
The treatment variable is now the change in death status within the round-trip, that
is, whether the artist i died between the purchase and resale of the work of art. Notice
that all time invariant controls, including artwork specific variables and individual fixed
effects disappear in the difference. Because individual artists may exhibit different risk
characteristics, we nevertheless retain a specification with a constant and individual fixed
effects:
rt,t+j = β0 +β1Diedi,t,t+j +β2Deceasedi,t + (Xi,t+j,t−Xi,t,t)γ+ δt+j− δt +αi + εi,t,t+j, (4)
where rt,t+j = logPi,t+j,k − logPi,t,k and Diedi,t,t+j = (PostDeathi,t+j −PostDeathi,t). We
also include an additional indicator variable, Deceasedi,t, that is equal to one when the
artist is deceased at purchase (i.e. at time t). A non-zero β2 tests whether treated artists
earn different returns after their death—whether there is a drift in prices. Our theory
predicts that the effect of death is permanent. We therefore expect an estimate of β1
that is close to the estimates presented in the top panel of Table III, and a β2 estimate
statistically indifferent from zero.
To construct our repeat-sale sample, we follow Pénasse and Renneboog (2018) to
identify artworks that have been auctioned at least twice. In this dataset, each pair of
transactions for the same item is a unique observation. We find 764 repeat sales for
70 treated artists that pass away within at least one round-trip and their 72 controls.
(We keep artists in the sample even if we did not find repeat sales for their matched
counterpart). We report the estimated β1- and β2-coefficients in Table XI. As expected,
the effect of death on returns is high: death events are associated with an “abnormal”
return of exp(0.477)− 1 = 61.1% on average, when compared to a typical matched artist
who does not die.
The effect is of the same magnitude when excluding the control group, so that returns
are also abnormally high compared to other round-trips without death events. In both
specifications, β2-coefficients are small and indistinguishable from zero, indicating returns
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are not different after death. This confirms that the effect on prices is permanent.
F. Alternative explanations — media attention, exhibits and estate sales
A possible alternative explanation for our results is that death increases an artist’s notori-
ety, in a way that is not well-captured by our controls for notoriety, and that more famous
artists trade more often. It is reasonable to expect that death increases notoriety—
Vincent van Gogh’s being a well-known example. Recall that, in Table IX, we found that
the death effect is absent for artists with low fame, suggesting that van Gogh’s story is the
exception rather than the rule. Further, the effect on prices and volume declines with the
age at death (Figure 2), which means that if increases in notoriety that are imperfectly
captured by our controls were the cause of the volume and price effects, the change in
notoriety should decrease with age of death. While this seems plausible—artists that are
older are probability more famous—this is difficult to square with the observation that
the death effect is absent for artists with low fame.
In addition, we find that the effect on volume remains about the same when we control
for the increases in artists’ post-death prices (Table X). This means that an artist’s added
notoriety following death has to affect volume in a way that is not only orthogonal to our
set of controls, but also to price changes.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to explore further if media exposure or exhibits increase
durably after an artist’s premature death, so that so that these notoriety measures can be
candidates to explain the permanent changes in prices and volume that we observe. We
perform two tests: (i) we compare the number of exhibitions (including retrospectives)
of the treated and control artists in relevant time-spans, and (ii) we compare the number
of times an artist is mentioned in the media (press) in the year before and after his death
while excluding the obituaries in the week/month after decease.
For our first test, we use data from Artfacts.net that catalogs exhibitions from a wide
range of artists; the exhibitions go back to the 19th century. We identified 5510 solo-
exhibitions for treated artists and 6237 solo-exhibitions for the matched artists in the
Artfacts.net data. We do not find any statistical differences in the number of exhibitions
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between treated and matched artist for several time windows—the two (three) years prior
to the death of the treated artist, the two (three) subsequent years, the life span of the
treated artist or the time span subsequent to the treated artist’s death.19
As a second test, we search for all mentions of our treated artists, in Factiva, a
global news monitoring in the year before and after their deaths. This media monitoring
and communications database comprises seven main search categories (Dow Jones, All,
Publications, Web News, Blogs, Pictures, Multimedia). The vast majority of our hits
come from the category of Publications, which includes mainly articles in newspapers
and magazines in 28 languages since 1990. We would like to measure a change in artist’s
notoriety but need to correct for the number of articles reporting the artist’s death.
Therefore, we partition the articles into those that provide information about the artists
and their oeuvre and those that are triggered by their decease (and hence are merely
obituaries).20 Since we use Factiva data starting in 1990, we have only 55 treated artists.
On average, there were 32.7 articles written around the world in the year before their
deaths. In the subsequent year (including the date of decease), the average number of
articles by artist is 77.6, which is (borderline) significantly different from the number prior
to death (with a t-value of 1.71). When we exclude the articles including an obituary in
the week (month) after the passing of an artist, we do not find a significant difference
between these two years at the usual confidence levels (t-value is 1.36).
Overall, our tests do not indicate a significant increase in our treated artists’ exposure
through media (articles in newspapers and magazines) or exhibitions just after an artists’
deaths.
One possible explanation for the increase in sales–though not for the simultaneous
increase in prices—is that following decease, an artist’s holdings of her own work would
19We count more exhibitions in the two years prior to death of the treated (212; 0.84 exhibition per
artist) than in the year of death and subsequent year (190; 0.75 per artist), but the difference is not
statistically significant. Using three years time windows yields similar results. The average number of
exhibitions during the life of treated artists (5.5) is significantly smaller than post-death (16.4), but the
post-death time window is, for most artists, much longer. If exhibitions explain the growth in reputation,
it is a gradual effect (on average, over more than four decades since death).
20We screened all articles in English, French, German, Dutch, Italian and Spanish, and used Google
translate for other languages.
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be sold-off, increasing total sales. If these estate sales were the reason for our results,
one would expect that following the death of an older artist this effect would be at
least as pronounced as the effect on younger artists, because older artists should be
able to accumulate a larger inventory of their own work, but our results in Figure 2
show that the volume effect declines markedly with age. In addition, the majority of
artists’ estate/foundations appoint one or more galleries to handle sales instead of auction
houses—making it less likely that sales by estates would add to the auction sales that we
use, at least for the first few years, when the volume effect is already clearly present.21
An artist’s heirs or trustees of the estate/foundation are often interested in increasing
the reputation of the deceased and galleries, particularly those who have had a long-term
relationship with the artist, are often committed to her legacy. A representing gallery
may also help underwrite the production of a “catalogue raisonné” and organize exhibits
at the gallery or interested museums. In addition, auction houses do not have access to
art fairs, an important venue for finding buyers. Finally, auction houses have a mixed
reputation among artists. As Chuck Close, the great American painter and photographer,
who has been represented since the last century by New York’s Pace Gallery and London’s
White Cube, told the New York Times “The last thing I want messing around with my
career is an auction house.”22
IV. Conclusions
We studied the impact of an exogenous negative supply shock to the float in the art mar-
ket, namely the impact of the premature and unexpected death of an artist on art prices
and the volume of transactions. When collectors have fluctuating heterogeneous beliefs,
since they cannot sell short, prices overweigh optimists’ beliefs and have a speculative
component that reflects the resale option. If collectors have limited capacity to bear risk,
a decrease in float may increase the value and the frequency of exercise of this resale
21Internet searches identify galleries appointed by estate/foundations of more than 90% of the first
fame-tercile of our treated artists that, as Table IX shows, is responsible for our results.
22New York Times, December 1 2017.
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option; increasing prices and turnover.
This is indeed the case according to our difference-in-differences experiment where we
compare price-volume following an artists’ death to price-volume of artists who survive
the treated artist, but are otherwise close in terms of age, “fame”, market value and
transaction frequency. We document that premature death increases price by 54.7%
while volume goes up by 63.2%. When we add the restriction that the death should not
only be premature but also sudden, the price and volume increases amount to 80.0% and
84.0%, respectively.
We also perform a sensitivity analysis on the definition of premature death (initially
set at 65 years) and show that the death-effect is more pronounced when the age at death
is lower, reflecting a potentially larger un-produced body of work. In addition, we show
that the death-effect is only present when the artist had achieved, while alive, sufficient
notoriety. Robustness tests varying the definitions of premature and notoriety, and testing
different (sub)samples confirm these results. A placebo test reassuringly shows that the
death-effect in a pseudo dataset is insignificant. We also exclude the possibility that our
findings of price-volume increases are driven by art investors’ portfolio reallocation or
that the volume-effect is merely a consequence of the price-effect.
Using data on auctions of paintings by artists that survived to age 70, recorded by
Blouin in 1957-2016, we calculate that our average prematurely deceased artist lost half
of her potential oeuvre. Remarkably, the resulting estimate of the price impact of this
loss of float is comparable to the one produced by Cochrane (2003) for the speculative
episode involving internet stocks or using the data in Xiong and Yu (2011) on speculation
on Chinese warrants. Nonetheless, while the Chinese warrants had expiration dates and
internet speculation imploded during the first semester of 2000, our results on price
and volume over the long-term (10+ years) and a repeat-sales analysis indicate that a
premature artist’s death produces a permanent shock to prices and volume. The presence
of these permanent effects supports the arguments in Glaeser et al. (2008) or Scheinkman
(2014) on the role of supply responses on the implosion of speculative episodes.23
23As documented by Ofek and Richardson (2003), the dot-com price crash was linked to the increase
23
Appendix A. A simple model
In this Appendix we exposit a simple model of speculation that motivates the regressions
in this paper. The model is related to the models in Hong et al. (2006) and Scheinkman
(2014), where investors speculate about dividend payments. Here, market participants
forecast how much utility they will gain from holding the asset.
There are an infinite number of time periods t = 1, 2 · · · , and two goods: art and
a numeraire non-art good. All agents have time-separable utility functions, a common
discount rate 1
1+r
per period and are risk-neutral. Investors receive in each period an
endowment of e units of the numeraire good and access to a “risk-free” technology on
the non-art good with a gross rate of return per period of 1 + r. There are two equally
sized groups of investors. At time t, before trading occurs, investors in group i ∈ {1, 2}
forecast that each unit of art-goods will give them next period (1+r)θit units of utility on
average. Investors face a cost of carry in their art-good inventory. There is no shorting,




at time t. More precisely, the representative agent of group i ∈ {1, 2} who has beliefs θit,
holds xt ≥ 0 units of art in period t and consumes ct units of consumption, and has a









2 + ct (A-1)
We assume that θit ∈ {θ`, θh}, θh > θ` > 0 for each (i, t) and that θ1t 6= θ2t . For simplicity
we assume that the value of θit is i.i.d. and the probability that θ
i
t = θ
h is .5. We
write θ̄ = .5(θ` + θh). Notice there is no aggregate uncertainty concerning beliefs on the
value the artist’s work, although aggregate uncertainty could be easily introduced. As
the regressions in the paper, the model concentrates on supply uncertainty and ignores
demand uncertainty.
We will assume that ct is not restricted to be positive or equivalently that e is large
enough. We write pt for the price of a unit of art in period t. Trading in period t occurs
in float that resulted from an unprecedented level of lockup expirations and insider selling.
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after θit obtains and a buyer of the art-work at t holds it until time t + 1 when one may
choose to sell or to hold it for one more period.
All investors start with an amount N0
2
of the art-good, where N0 is the total supply
at time 0. In period 1 the aggregate supply (inelastically) increases to N1, with N1 > N0.
At t = 2 the aggregate supply N2 is either N1 (with probability π) or µN
1 with µ > 1.
The lower supply indicates the artist died between periods 1 and 2. Aggregate supply
from period 3 on is equal to the supply in period 2, that is artists that survive to period
2 die before period 3.
From period 2 on, there is no change in supply. We will look for an equilibrium in
which for t ≥ 2 prices remain constant and the allocation of the art-work to group i only




t) for i = 1, 2 and all t ≥ 2. If p
stands for the price of an unit of art from period 2 on, we obtain the first order condition
for a potential buyer in period t ≥ 2 who has forecast (1 + r)(θit):














where δ := r
1+r
.
The constant equilibrium price that prevails period 2 on would depend on the actual
realization of supply, N2. There are two possibilities. The first is an equilibrium where at
each t ≥ 2, the currently most optimistic group holds the full supply of art-works. Since
this group must hold a per-capita amount N2, this requires that the equilibrium price





Such an equilibrium also requires that the currently pessimistic group chooses to hold
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zero in period t when the price equals p̄ in periods t and t+ 1, that is: θ`− δp̂(N2) ≤ 0 or
γN2 ≤ θh − θ` (A-4)
Notice that condition (A-4) also guarantees the non-negativity of the price given by
(A-3). Thus (A-4) is also sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in which only the
group that receives signal θh buys art-works. Hence, if differences in utilities are large
relative to the supply (multiplied by the holding-cost coefficient γ) then, in equilibrium,
only the most optimistic agents hold the art-work. Furthermore, the buyer of the art-
work has a 50% probability of wanting to reduce her demand to zero in the next period.
If she were forced instead to hold the asset for s periods, then her demand D in period
2 for art-works, if the art-work price pt = p̄ for t ≥ 2, would satisfy:








with equality if D > 0. It is easy to check that for s large, this inequality cannot be
satisfied when p̄ = p̂(N2) =
θh−γN2
δ
and D = N2. In fact when s =∞, i.e., when only buy
and hold strategies are allowed, then:



















A buyer who is optimistic today benefits from the option of reselling her art-work
to another agent who has become more optimistic than her in the future, and places a
value on that option of θ
h−θ`
2r
. If resale is ruled out and only buy-and-hold strategies are
allowed, optimists would not be willing to purchase the full supply at the price p̄.
On the other hand, if γN2 > θ
h − θ` then in equilibrium both types hold positive
amounts of the art-good and the equilibrium price p̃ is
p̃ =













Again, an optimist purchases a larger quantity and gains from the option to resell. How-
ever, that option is less valuable than in the case where optimists hold the full supply,





Notice that both p̂(N2) and p̃(N2) are strictly decreasing in the supply N2. On the
other hand, p̃(N2) < p̂(N2) if and only if θ
h − θ` − γN2 > 0 that is exactly in the region
where p̂ is the equilibrium price. Thus if an artist dies prematurely (supply equals N1)
the post-death price for her work is larger than the post-death price of the work of an
artist who dies later (supply equals µN1).
Notice that if µγN1 ≤ θh−θ`, then only the most optimistic would hold the art-works
of an artist from period 2 on, and consequently the expected turnover of both prematurely
deceased and surviving artists is 1
2
, for t ≥ 2. On the other hand, if γN1 > θh− θ` then in
both cases we obtain an interior equilibrium. It follows from (A-6) that the difference in
holdings between the most and less optimistic buyers is θ
h−θ`
γ




. Hence, turnover is strictly lower if an artist survives to period 2, since in
this case N2 is higher than when an artist dies between periods 1 and 2. Finally, if
γN1 < θ
h− θ` < µγN1 then if an artists dies between periods 1 and 2, in the equilibrium
for t ≥ 2, only the most optimistic agent holds the art-works and expected turnover is
1/2. However if an artist survives to period 2, the equilibrium for t ≥ 2 is interior and





. We have thus established:
Proposition. Prices for art produced by an artist who survives to period 2 are perma-
nently lower than prices of art produced by an artist who does not survive to period 2.
Turnover of art-work produced by an artist who survives to period 2 is permanently less
than or equal to the turnover of art of an artist that dies between periods 1 and 2, the
difference being strict unless the accumulated output of a surviving artist is low enough
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relative to the difference in marginal utility forecasts between optimists and pessimists
(µγN1 ≤ θh − θ`.)
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Table I: Cause of death
N Share of total (%)
Panel A: All deaths
Unknown 88 35.5
Cancer 39 15.7
Unspecified illness 20 8.1
AIDS 10 4.0
Other disease 8 3.2
Heart disease 5 2.0
Tuberculosis 5 2.0
Alcohol and drug-related disease 4 1.6
Suicide∗ 1 0.4
Sudden death 68 27.4
Total 248 100.0
Panel B: Sudden deaths
Heart attack 24 35.3
Suicide 11 16.2
Accident or murder 11 16.2
Sudden unspecified cause 7 10.3
Overdose 5 7.4
Sudden disease 4 5.9
Stroke 4 5.9
Complications from surgery 2 2.9
Total 68 100.0
This table reports the composition of our sample of artists who died between 1958 and
2014. Based on the cited cause of death in obituaries, biographical memoirs, newspaper
articles, magazine articles, and Google searches (including Wikipedia articles), Panel A
classifies the cause of deaths into Cancer; AIDS; Heart disease; Tuberculosis; Alcohol
and drug-related disease; Other disease; Unspecified illness (for cases in which the precise
disease is not reported); Unknown; Sudden death. ∗ This observation corresponds to
Keith Vaughan. Vaughan died of suicide, but we classify his death as predictable since
he had been diagnosed cancer two years prior to his death. Panel B reports the cause of
death for the subsample of sudden deaths from Panel A.
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Table II: Matched sample
Variable Sample Mean SD Min Max
Year of birth Deceased ≤ 65 years 1924.4 16.2 1894.0 1966.0
Control group 1924.7 16.3 1892.0 1966.0
Year of death Deceased ≤ 65 years 1978.7 14.1 1958.0 2013.0
Control groupa 1993.8 12.9 1970.0 2018.0
Age at death Deceased ≤ 65 years 54.3 9.3 23.0 65.0
Control groupa 77.0 7.8 66.0 101.0
Av. price at treatment (thousands)b Deceased ≤ 65 years 9.8 11.8 1.0 82.9
Control group 10.4 11.6 1.1 80.2
Av. yearly volume at treatment Deceased ≤ 65 years 0.9 3.4 0.0 36.7
Control group 0.8 3.0 0.0 25.7
Fame at treatmentc Deceased ≤ 65 years -0.0 0.9 -0.5 3.6
Control group -0.1 0.9 -0.5 3.6
No. of artists Deceased ≤ 65 years 242.0
Control group 242.0
This table reports summary statistics for the group of treated and control artists defined in Section
II.C. The statistics are computed using data prior to the year of death of the treated artist. Prices
are reported in 2015 dollars. Volume is defined as the total number of transactions per year. Fame is
the standardized percentage of mentions of each artist name in the English-language books digitized by
Google Books. a For the 165 control artists who die in our sample. b For the 73 treated and control
artists who are ‘active’ with at least one transaction prior to the treated artist’s death. c For the 242
artists (and their controls) who pass away before 2009 (when Google nGram data is available).
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Table III: Impact of artist death on prices and volume – Matched sample
With control group Without control group
Panel A: Death and auction prices
Deceased ≤65 years 0.436 0.277
t-stat (3.88) (2.11)
Year and age fixed effects and hed. controls Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 57,997 37,178
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 72+72 72
Panel B: Death and volume
Deceased ≤65 years 0.490 0.437
t-stat (3.34) (2.99)
Year and age fixed effects Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 26,865 13,449
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 242+242 242
This table shows the β1-coefficients in Equations (1)-(2). The sample consists of artists
who passed away at the age of 65 or earlier together with their matched controls (left
column). We also report estimates with treated artists only in the right column. Panel
A gives OLS estimates of a regression of log real auction prices on the treatment dummy,
while controlling for year, age and individual fixed effects, two dummies proxying for
notoriety (a dummy equal to one when the artist had exhibited at the Documenta and
another one when the artist has sold at least once at Sotheby’s or Christie’s in London or
New York), and the full set of controls to address artwork heterogeneity (medium, auction
house, a dummy equal to one if the artwork is signed, a dummy equal to one if the artwork
is dated, artwork height and width). Panel B gives conditional quasi-maximum likelihood
Poisson estimates of a regression of annual trading volume on the same set of controls
(minus artwork-specific controls). Note the smaller number of artists in Panel A than
in Panel B; measuring the death effect on art price requires that artists are active on
the auction market before their death, hence the smaller sample. Standard errors are
clustered at the artist level.
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Table IV: Turnover elasticity of price
Elasticity Source
Panel A: Art Sample
Average float change of early death ∆f −0.50 Authors’s calculation
Average log price change ∆p 0.46 Table III
Average log volume change ∆v 0.49 Table III








Float elasticity of turnover εft = εfv − 1 −1.98







Panel B: Related Studies
Turnover elasticity of price εtp 0.38 Cochrane (2003) (Table 3)
Turnover elasticity of price εtp 0.24 Xiong and Yu (2011) and
authors’s calculation.
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Table V: Impact of artist death on prices and volume – Full sample
Unmatched Without
control group control group
Panel A: Death and auction prices
Deceased ≤65 years 0.415 0.246
t-stat (3.98) (1.86)
Year and age fixed effects and hed. controls Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 694,071 41,576
No. of artists (treated + all controls) 76+2160 76
Panel B: Death and volume
Deceased ≤65 years 0.479 0.460
t-stat (3.05) (3.20)
Year and age fixed effects Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 124,273 13,657
No. of artists (treated + all controls) 246+1990 246
This table shows the β1-coefficients in Equations (1)-(2). The sample consists of all artists
alive at the beginning of the sample period (1957) or later. We also report estimates with
treated artists only in the right column. Panel A gives OLS estimates of a regression of log
real auction prices on the treatment dummy, while controlling for year, age and individual
fixed effects, two dummies proxying for notoriety (a dummy equal to one when the artist
had exhibited at the Documenta and another one when the artist has sold at least once
at Sotheby’s or Christie’s in London or New York), and the full set of controls to address
artwork heterogeneity (medium, auction house, a dummy equal to one if the artwork is
signed, a dummy equal to one if the artwork is dated, artwork height and width). Panel
B gives conditional quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson estimates of a regression of annual
trading volume on the same set of controls (minus artwork-specific controls). Standard
errors are clustered at the artist level.
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Table VI: Impact of artist death on prices and volume – Alternative control
for notioriety (1957-2008)
With control group Without control group
Panel A: Death and auction prices
Deceased ≤65 years 0.360 0.248
t-stat (3.16) (2.11)
Year and age fixed effects and hed. controls Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 31,653 18,643
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 72+72 72
Panel B: Death and volume
Deceased ≤65 years 0.406 0.409
t-stat (2.98) (3.33)
Year and age fixed effects Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 22,651 11,329
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 242+242 242
This table shows the β1-coefficients in Equations (1)-(2). Similarly to Table III, the
sample consists of artists who passed away at the age of 65 or earlier together with their
matched controls (left column). The sample stops in 2008 because our Fame control is
only available through 2008. We also report estimates with treated artists only in the
right column. Panel A gives OLS estimates of a regression of log real auction prices
on the treatment dummy, with a similar set of controls as in Table III, to which we
add an alternative definition of notioriety (as measured by the percentage of mentions
of each artist name in the English-language books digitized by Google Books). Panel B
gives conditional quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson estimates of a regression of annual
trading volume on the same set of controls (minus artwork-specific controls). Standard
errors are clustered at the artist level.
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Table VII: Impact of artist death on prices and volume – Placebo sample
With control group Without control group
Panel A: Death and auction prices
Deceased ≤65 years -0.058 0.106
t-stat (-0.49) (1.16)
Year and age fixed effects and hed. controls Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 42,212 18,876
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 69+69 69
Panel B: Death and volume
Deceased ≤65 years -0.180 -0.067
t-stat (-1.14) (-0.41)
Year and age fixed effects Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 25,323 12,648
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 235+235 235
This table shows the β1-coefficients in Equations (1)-(2). The sample consists of a placebo
sample consisting of the matched artists in the baseline regression (Table III). We drop
artists who passed away at 65 or earlier and use this placebo group as treated sample. We
assign a placebo date of death to each placebo-treated artist, corresponding to the date
of the premature death of the matched artists who actually passed away prematurely. We
then match these these artists, who are assigned a placebo premature death date, with a
new group of control artists. We also report estimates with placebo-treated artists only
in the right column. Panel A gives OLS estimates of a regression of log real auction prices
on the treatment dummy, while controlling for year, age and individual fixed effects, two
dummies proxying for notoriety (a dummy equal to one when the artist had exhibited
at the Documenta and another one when the artist has sold at least once at Sotheby’s
or Christie’s in London or New York), and the full set of controls to address artwork
heterogeneity (medium, auction house, a dummy equal to one if the artwork is signed, a
dummy equal to one if the artwork is dated, artwork height and width). Panel B gives
conditional quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson estimates of a regression of annual trading
volume on the same set of controls (minus artwork-specific controls). Standard errors are
clustered at the artist level.
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Table VIII: Impact of artist death on prices and volume – Sudden deaths
With control group Without control group
Panel A: Death and auction prices
Deceased ≤65 years 0.588 0.307
t-stat (3.23) (1.77)
Year and age fixed effects and hed. controls Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 24,071 18,607
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 19+19 19
Panel B: Death and volume
Deceased ≤65 years 0.610 0.690
t-stat (2.40) (4.16)
Year and age fixed effects Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 6,766 3,135
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 65+65 65
This table shows the β1-coefficients in Equations (1)-(2). The sample consists of artists
who suddenly passed away at the age of 65 or earlier together with their matched con-
trols (left column). We report characteristics of the sudden death sample in Table I.
We also report estimates with treated artists only in the right column. Panel A gives
OLS estimates of a regression of log real auction prices on the treatment dummy, while
controlling for year, age and individual fixed effects, two dummies proxying for notoriety
(a dummy equal to one when the artist had exhibited at the Documenta and another one
when the artist has sold at least once at Sotheby’s or Christie’s in London or New York),
and the full set of controls to address artwork heterogeneity (medium, auction house, a
dummy equal to one if the artwork is signed, a dummy equal to one if the artwork is
dated, artwork height and width). Panel B gives conditional quasi-maximum likelihood
Poisson estimates of a regression of annual trading volume on the same set of controls
(minus artwork-specific controls). Standard errors are clustered at the artist level.
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Table IX: Impact of artist death on prices and volume – Conditioning on Fame
at Death (1957-2008)
High Fame Low Fame
Panel A: Death and auction prices
Deceased ≤65 years 0.599 -0.224
t-stat (4.57) (-1.42)
Year and age fixed effects and hed. controls Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 45,385 2,480
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 24+24 24+24
Panel B: Death and volume
Deceased ≤65 years 0.586 0.029
t-stat (2.87) (0.12)
Year and age fixed effects Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 8,815 7,629
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 81+81 81+81
This table shows the β1-coefficients in Equations (1)-(2). Similarly to Table III, the
sample consists of artists who passed away at the age of 65 or earlier together with
their matched controls. The left/right column shows results for artist which Fame (as
measured by the percentage of mentions of each artist name in the English-language
books digitized by Google Books) is within the top/bottom tercile at the year of their
death. The sample stops in 2008 because our Fame data is only available through 2008.
Panel A gives OLS estimates of a regression of log real auction prices on the treatment
dummy, with a similar set of controls as in Table III. Panel B gives conditional quasi-
maximum likelihood Poisson estimates of a regression of annual trading volume on the
same set of controls (minus artwork-specific controls). Standard errors are clustered at
the artist level.
40
Table X: Impact of artist death on volume – Controlling for artist prices
High Fame Low Fame
δi,t 0.168 0.138
t-stat (3.59) (1.99)
Deceased ≤65 years 0.458 0.420
t-stat (3.48) (3.14)
Year and age fixed effects Y Y
Artist fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 4,993 2,467
No. of artists (treated + matched controls) 72+72 72
This table shows the β1-coefficients in Equation (2), while controlling for the average
price of items sold for each artist-year. The sample consists of active artists who passed
away at the age of 65 or earlier together with their matched controls (left column). We
also report estimates with treated artists only in the right column. The log artist price
index δi, t is constructed according to Eq. (3) and is linearly interpolated in the absence
of trading volume for a given artist-year. Standard errors are clustered at the artist level.
Table XI: Impact of artist death on round-trip returns
With control group Without control group
Died ≤ 65 during round-trip 0.477 0.392
t-stat (2.15) (1.71)
Deceased ≤ 65 at purchase 0.028 0.007
t-stat (0.49) (0.05)
Year and age fixed effects and hed. controls Y Y
Individual fixed effects Y Y
No. of observations 764 442
No. of artists (treated + controls) 70+72 70
This table shows the β1- and β2− coefficients in Equation (4). The first coefficient
measures the death effect, similarly to our hedonic specification (1). The β2 coefficient
tests whether treated artists earn different returns after their death. The sample consists
of repeat-sales for artists who passed away at the age of 65 or earlier, as well as their
matched controls (left column). We also report estimates with treated artists only in the
right column. Standard errors are clustered at the artist level.
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Figure 1: Distribution of premature death events
This figure depicts the number of artists who died a the age of 65 or earlier in a specific
year over our time span 1958-2014. The total sample of artists who died prematurely
over our sample window (1957-2016) amounts to 258. In order to analyze the impact of
death on prices and returns, we require at least one year of price data before an after the




Figure 2: The death effect declines with the age at death
Panels (a) and (b) present the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the causal
impact of death interacted with the age at death. The sample includes all artists who
are alive at the beginning of our sample period (1957). Panel (a) gives OLS estimates
(based on Equation (1)); Panel (b) gives QML Poisson estimates (based on Equation




Figure 3: Prices and trading volume around year of death
Panels (a) and (b) present the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the causal
impact of death in a given year relative to the artist’s death. The sample includes all
treated artists who are active prior to their death. Panel (a) gives OLS estimates (based
on Equation (1)); Panel (b) gives QML Poisson estimates (based on Equation (2)), similar
to Column 1 of Table III. Observations more than 5 (10) years before (after) the death
are grouped together. Standard errors are clustered at the artist level.
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Appendix – For Online Publication
Matched Sample
Treated artists Controls
Artist Birth Death Active Artist Birth Death
Aagaard Andersen, Gunnar 1919 1982 Lassnig, Maria 1919 2014
Abedin, Zainul 1914 1976 Hogan, Joao 1914 1988
Afro 1912 1976 Y Soulages, Pierre 1919 –
Ali, Shakir 1916 1975 Heyboer, Anton 1924 2005
Altenbourg, Gerhard 1926 1989 Y Trujillo, Guillermo 1927 –
Angus, Rita 1908 1970 Korniss, Dezso 1908 1984
Apap, William 1918 1970 Quiros, Antonio 1918 1984
Arbus, Diane 1923 1971 Bury, Pol 1922 2005
Arkley, Howard 1951 1999 Y Oulton, Therese 1953 –
Atlan, Jean-Michel 1913 1960 Butler, Reg 1913 1981
Ayrton, Michael 1921 1975 Y Johnson, Ray 1927 1995
Baldessin, George 1939 1978 Y Attersee, Christian Ludwig 1940 –
Bandeira, Antonio 1922 1967 Cruz-Diez, Carlos 1923 –
Batlle Planas, Juan 1911 1966 Paniker, K. C. S. 1911 1977
Bazile, Castera 1923 1966 Palacios, Luisa 1923 1990
Baziotes, William 1912 1963 Burri, Alberto 1915 1995
Bela 1917 1968 Hare, David 1917 1992
Belkin, Arnold 1930 1992 Y Felguerez, Manuel 1928 –
Beuys, Joseph 1921 1986 Y Pearlstein, Philip 1924 –
Binyinyiwuy 1928 1982 Imai, Toshimitsu 1928 2002
Birolli, Renato 1905 1959 Porter, Fairfield 1907 1975
Boetti, Alighiero 1940 1994 Onobrakpeya, Bruce 1932 –
Bogusz, Marian 1920 1980 Castro, Amilcar de 1920 2002
Bonevardi, Marcelo 1929 1994 Y Saul, Peter 1934 –
Borduas, Paul-Emile 1905 1960 Cremer, Fritz 1906 1993
Brauner, Victor 1903 1966 Krasner, Lee 1908 1984
Bredow, Rudolf 1909 1973 Bergman, Anna-Eva 1909 1987
Brittain, Miller 1912 1968 Spyropoulos, Yannis 1912 1990
Broodthaers, Marcel 1924 1976 Neri, Manuel 1930 –
Brown, Joan 1938 1990 Weiner, Lawrence 1942 –
Brown, Mike 1938 1997 Y Jaray, Tess 1937 –
Bruning, Peter 1929 1970 Larter, Richard 1929 2014
Buthe, Michael 1944 1994 Y McLean, Bruce 1944 –
Caballero, Luis 1943 1995 Y Mosset, Olivier 1944 –
Campbell, George 1917 1979 Y Rodhe, Lennart 1916 2005
Carrillo, Lilia 1930 1974 Claus, Carlfriedrich 1930 1998
Castagnino, Juan Carlos 1908 1972 Stematsky, Avigdor 1908 1989
Chaissac, Gaston 1910 1964 Lamba, Jacqueline 1910 1993
Chambers, Jack 1931 1978 Comtois, Ulysse 1931 1999
Cherkaoui, Ahmed 1934 1967 Gaucher, Yves 1934 2000
Chighine, Alfredo 1914 1974 Y Messagier, Jean 1920 1999
Christensen, Dan 1942 2007 Y Self, Colin 1941 –
Chukwuogo-Roy, Chinwe 1952 2012 Von Hausswolff, C. M. 1956 –
Colquhoun, Robert 1914 1962 Schumacher, Emil 1912 1999
Corbett, Edward 1919 1971 Abreu, Mario 1919 1993
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Coronel, Pedro 1923 1985 Y Colville, Alex 1920 2013
Corzas, Francisco 1936 1983 Y Chavez, Gerardo 1937 –
Crippa, Roberto 1921 1972 Y Sugai, Kumi 1919 1996
Curnoe, Greg 1936 1992 Gershuni, Moshe 1936 2017
Cutrone, Ronnie 1948 2013 Y Cahn, Miriam 1949 –
Dallaire, Jean 1916 1965 Badii, Libero 1916 2001
Daraniyagala, Justin Pieris 1903 1967 Wang Xuetao 1903 1982
Davies, John 1936 1999 Y Goode, Joe 1937 –
Davis, Gene 1920 1985 Y Carrington, Leonora 1917 2011
Defeo, Jay 1929 1989 Beksinski, Zdzislaw 1929 2005
Deira, Ernesto 1928 1986 Y Makowski, Zbigniew 1930 –
Dekkers, Ad 1938 1974 Lancaster, Mark 1938 –
Deyrolle, Jean 1911 1967 Orlando, Felipe 1911 2001
Diller, Burgoyne 1906 1965 Aeschbacher, Hans 1906 1980
Disney, Walt 1901 1966 Turner, Helen Monro 1901 1977
Djanira 1914 1979 Guerrero, Jose 1914 1991
Dotremont, Christian 1922 1979 Day, Melvin 1923 2016
Downey, Juan 1940 1993 Attersee, Christian Ludwig 1940 –
Dumouchel, Albert 1916 1971 Gysin, Brion 1916 1986
Duwe, Harald 1926 1984 Johnson, George Henry 1926 2007
Eardley, Joan 1921 1963 Raza, Sayed Haider 1922 –
Echeverria, Enrique 1923 1972 Hlito, Alfredo 1923 1994
Endara Crow, Gonzalo 1936 1996 Y Amaral, Antonio Henrique 1935 2015
Engilberts, Jon 1908 1972 Marczynski, Adam 1908 1985
Espaliu, Pepe 1955 1993 Nel, Karel Anthony 1955 –
Evans, Merlyn 1910 1973 Y Lancaster, Osbert 1908 1986
Eyuboglu, Bedri Rahmi 1911 1975 Lardera, Berto 1911 1989
Fahlstrom, Oyvind 1928 1976 Scott, Patrick 1921 2014
Fairhurst, Angus 1966 2008 Y Paine, Roxy 1966 –
Farrell, Micheal 1940 2000 Y Wilson, Robert 1941 –
Feeley, Paul 1910 1966 Mortensen, Richard 1910 1993
Feni, Dumile 1942 1991 Bruggen, Coosje van 1942 2009
Fernhout, Edgar 1912 1974 Cage, John 1912 1992
Ferren, John 1905 1970 Cadmus, Paul 1904 1999
Fisher, Sandra 1947 1994 Y Lavier, Bertrand 1949 –
Flavin, Dan 1933 1996 Y Buren, Daniel 1938 –
Fomison, Tony 1939 1990 Y Polesello, Rogelio 1939 2014
Forg, Gunther 1952 2013 Y Scharf, Kenny 1958 –
Fraile, Alfonso 1930 1988 Y Brizzi, Ary 1930 2014
Freedman, Barnett 1901 1958 Johnson, William H. 1901 1970
Frink,Elisabeth 1930 1993 Y Cuevas, Jose Luis 1934 –
Fruhtrunk, Gunter 1923 1982 Y Kupferman, Moshe 1926 2003
Fu Baoshi 1904 1965 Messel, Oliver 1904 1978
Gadanyi, Jeno 1896 1960 Adalid, Agustin Lazo 1896 1971
Galan, Julio 1958 2006 Y Currie, Ken 1960 –
Garcia Ponce, Fernando 1933 1987 Molinari, Guido 1933 2004
Gnoli, Domenico (ii) 1933 1970 Ferrer, Rafael 1933 –
Goldstein, Jack 1945 2003 Y Nerdrum, Odd 1944 –
Gonzales-Torres, Felix 1957 1996 Sitthiket, Vasan 1957 –
Gonzalez, Juan 1945 1993 Piper, Adrian 1948 –
Graves, Nancy 1939 1995 Hiller, Susan 1940 –
Greco, Alberto 1931 1965 Baya 1931 1998
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Grundig, Hans 1901 1958 Evergood, Philip 1901 1973
Grunwald, Henryk 1904 1958 Mason, Alice Trumbull 1904 1971
Guerrero Galvan, Jesus 1910 1973 Sterne, Hedda 1910 2011
Gundersen, Gunnar S. 1921 1983 Garcia Guerrero, Luis 1921 1996
Hardin, Helen 1943 1984 Rosler, Martha 1943 –
Haring, Keith 1958 1990 Y Paladino, Mimmo 1948 –
Hennessy, Patrick 1915 1980 Dzubas, Friedel 1915 1994
Hesse, Eva 1936 1970 Ono, Yoko 1933 –
Hester, Joy 1920 1960 Gonzalez Bogen, Carlos 1920 1992
Hilton, Roger 1911 1975 Y Schultze, Bernard 1915 2005
Hockelmann, Antonius 1937 2000 Y Max, Peter 1937 –
Hung, Francisco 1937 2001 Y Senbergs, Jan 1939 –
Immendorff, Jorg 1945 2007 Y Fetting, Rainer 1949 –
Jacoulet, Paul 1896 1960 Rodriguez Lozano, Manuel 1896 1971
Jarema, Maria 1908 1958 Aroch, Arie 1908 1974
Jarman, Derek 1942 1994 Y Petrick, Wolfgang 1939 –
John, Jiri 1923 1972 Kemble, Kenneth 1923 1998
Jones, Joe 1909 1963 Stromme, Olav 1909 1978
Jorn, Asger 1914 1973 Y Friend, Donald 1914 1989
Kazuki, Yasuo 1911 1974 Benoit, Rigaud 1911 1986
Kelley, Mike 1954 2012 Y Sherman, Cindy 1954 –
Kemeny, Zoltan 1907 1965 Kotin, Albert 1907 1980
Kenny, Michael 1941 1999 Y Pacheco, Ana-Maria 1943 –
Kim Hwan-gi 1913 1974 Oppenheim, Meret 1913 1985
King, Cecil 1921 1986 Espinola Gomez, Manuel 1921 2003
Kinley, Peter 1926 1988 Y Skotnes, Cecil 1926 2009
Kippenberger, Martin 1953 1997 Y Schutte, Thomas 1954 –
Klein, Yves 1928 1962 Leslie, Alfred 1927 –
Kline, Franz 1910 1962 Graves, Morris 1910 2001
Kobzdej, Aleksander 1920 1972 Barcala, Washington 1920 1993
Kondor, Bela 1931 1972 Coughtry, Graham 1931 1999
Kudo, Tetsumi 1935 1990 Y Rodriguez, Alirio 1934 2018
Kurelek, William 1927 1977 Y Rainer, Arnulf 1929 –
Lanyon, Peter 1918 1964 Johnson, Lester 1919 2010
Lasekan, Akinola 1916 1972 Thieler, Fred 1916 1999
Lavonen, Ahti 1928 1970 Swaminathan, Jagdish 1928 1994
Ledy, Cheik 1962 1997 Yuskavage, Lisa 1962 –
Leura Tjapaltjarri, Tim 1929 1984 Metzkes, Harald 1929 –
Licini, Osvaldo 1894 1958 Reggiani, Mauro 1897 1980
Lo Savio, Francesco 1935 1963 Sihlali, Durant 1935 2004
Louis, Morris 1912 1962 Guttuso, Renato 1911 1987
Lueg, Konrad 1939 1996 Y Donaldson, Anthony 1939 –
Lui Shou-kwan 1919 1975 Walters, Gordon 1919 1995
Lunar, Emerio 1940 1990 Coen, Arnaldo 1940 –
MacBryde, Robert 1913 1966 Gopas, Rudolf 1913 1983
Macdonald, Jock 1897 1960 Yirawala 1897 1976
Mafai, Mario 1902 1965 Sternberg, Harry 1904 2001
Magani, Mick 1920 1984 Muller, Robert 1920 2003
Malaval, Robert 1937 1980 Suarez, Pablo 1937 2006
Manzoni, Piero 1933 1963 Katz, Alex 1927 –
Mapplethorpe, Robert 1946 1989 Anderson, Laurie 1947 –
Marika, Mawalan 1908 1967 Camarena, Jorge Gonzalez 1908 1980
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Marika, Wandjuk 1927 1987 Malangi, David 1927 1999
Martin, Mary 1907 1969 Bill, Max 1908 1994
Matta-Clark, Gordon 1943 1978 Turrell, James 1943 –
Maymurru, Narritjin 1916 1981 Palazuelo, Pablo 1916 2007
McHale, John 1922 1978 Niro, Robert de, Sr. 1922 1993
Medek, Mikulas 1926 1974 Capdevila, F. M. 1926 1995
Mendieta, Ana 1948 1985 Abramovic, Marina 1946 –
Messil, Gabriel 1934 1986 Khakhar, Bhupen 1934 2003
Millares, Manolo 1926 1972 Aitchison, Craigie 1926 2009
Milpurrurru, George 1934 1998 Y Cohen, Bernard 1933 –
Minaux, Andre 1923 1986 Y Renqvist, Torsten 1924 2007
Mithinari 1929 1976 Gironella, Alberto 1929 1999
Moke 1950 2001 Y Coe, Sue 1951 –
Molvig, Jon 1923 1970 Alonso, Raul 1923 1993
Morton, Ree 1936 1977 Wakabayashi, Isamu 1936 2003
Mualla, Fikret 1903 1967 Rimsa, Juan 1903 1978
Munoz, Juan 1953 2001 Y Leirner, Jac 1961 –
Namatjira, Albert 1902 1959 Carter, Clarence Holbrook 1904 2000
Nanninga, Jaap 1904 1962 Burra, Edward 1905 1976
Newman, Barnett 1905 1970 Motherwell, Robert 1915 1991
Nickolls, Trevor 1949 2012 Y Koningsbruggen, Rob van 1948 –
Oiticica, Helio 1937 1980 Brawley, Robert J 1937 2006
Ojeda, Gustavo 1958 1989 Y Favier, Phillipe 1957 –
Onus, Lin 1948 1996 Woodrow, Bill 1948 –
Orszag, Lili 1926 1978 Thomas, Rover 1926 1998
Paalen, Wolfgang 1905 1959 Tworkov, Jack 1900 1982
Pacheco, Maria Luisa 1919 1982 Y Lataster, Ger 1920 2012
Palermo, Blinky 1943 1977 Marioni, Joseph 1943 2009
Pancetti, Jose Gianini 1902 1958 Stokes, Adrian 1902 1972
Pane, Gina 1939 1990 Alviani, Getulio 1939 2018
Park, David 1911 1960 Mariano 1912 1980
Parvez, Ahmed 1926 1979 Ronald, William 1926 1998
Paschke, Ed 1939 2004 Y Knoebel, Imi 1940 –
Pedro, Antonio 1909 1966 Lewis, Norman 1909 1979
Peeters, Jozef 1895 1960 Maxy, Max Herman 1895 1971
Pike, Jimmy 1940 2002 Y Revilla, Carlos 1940 –
Poliakoff, Serge 1906 1969 Y Manessier, Alfred 1911 1993
Ponc, Joan 1927 1984 Rivera, Manuel 1927 1995
Popkov, Viktor 1932 1974 Uglow, Euan 1932 2000
Portinari, Candido 1903 1962 Clifton, Marshall 1903 1975
Potworowski, Piotr 1898 1962 Y Zack, Leon 1892 1980
Preller, Alexis 1911 1975 Y Meistermann, Georg 1911 1990
Reinhardt, Ad 1913 1967 Smith, Tony 1912 1980
Requichot, Bernard 1929 1961 Munoz, Lucio 1929 1998
Rhoades, Jason 1965 2006 Bulloch, Angela 1966 –
Richier, Germaine 1902 1959 Herrera, Velino 1902 1973
Sadequain 1930 1987 Pomodoro, Gio 1930 2002
Sage, Kay 1898 1963 Feng Zikai 1898 1975
Schwalbe, Ole 1929 1990 Y Hrdlicka, Alfred 1928 2009
Seitz, Gustav 1906 1969 Baij, Ramkinker 1906 1980
Seligmann, Kurt 1900 1962 Woodruff, Hale 1900 1980
Sempere, Eusebio 1923 1985 Cesariny, Mario 1923 2006
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Serpa, Ivan 1923 1973 Jess (Collins, Burgess) 1923 2004
Shi Lu 1919 1982 Yamamoto, Taro 1919 1994
Silva, Carlos 1930 1987 Eggenschwiler, Franz 1930 2000
Skold, Otte 1894 1958 Bernath, Aurel 1895 1982
Smith, David 1906 1965 Brooks, James 1906 1992
Smithson, Robert 1938 1973 Bell, Larry 1939 –
Sokolov-Skalya, Pavel 1899 1961 Glarner, Fritz 1899 1972
Stajuda, Jerzy 1936 1992 Golden, Daan van 1936 2017
Stankiewicz, Richard 1922 1983 Velarde, Pablita 1918 2006
Stepanova, Varvara 1894 1958 Centurion, Emilio 1894 1970
Stohrer, Walter 1937 2000 Y Iseli, Rolf 1934 –
Swift, Patrick 1927 1983 Daws, Lawrence 1927 –
Takamatsu, Jiro 1936 1998 Y Schonebeck, Eugen 1936 –
Taylor, E. Mervyn 1906 1964 Grundig, Lea 1906 1977
Thek, Paul 1933 1988 Tousignant, Claude 1932 –
Thomkins, Andre 1930 1985 Y Tubke, Werner 1929 2004
Thompson, Bob 1937 1966 Scholder, Fritz 1937 2005
Tschusiya, Tilsa 1928 1984 Fernandez, Agustin 1928 2006
Tsingos, Thanos 1914 1965 Balint, Endre 1914 1986
Tuckson, Tony 1921 1973 Iskowitz, Gershon 1921 1988
Valcin, Gerard 1927 1988 Y Guinovart, Josep 1927 2007
Varo, Remedios 1908 1963 Lewers, Margo 1908 1978
Vassilieff, Danila 1897 1958 Pan Tianshou 1897 1971
Vaughan, Keith 1912 1977 Y Turcato, Giulio 1912 1995
Vega, Jorge de la 1930 1971 D’Arcangelo, Allan 1930 1998
Vordemberge-Gildewart, F. 1899 1962 Carvalho, Flavio de 1899 1973
Warhol, Andy 1928 1987 Y Riopelle, Jean-Paul 1923 2002
West, Franz 1947 2012 Y Neshat, Shirin 1957 –
White, Charles Wilbert 1918 1979 Solari, Luis 1918 1993
Whiteley, Brett 1939 1992 Y Kirkeby, Per 1938 –
Wiedemann, Guillermo 1905 1969 Narvaez, Francisco 1905 1982
Wilke, Hannah 1940 1993 Armajani, Siah 1939 –
Wilkerson, Jerry 1943 2007 Y Buraimoh, Jimoh 1943 –
Williams, Fred 1927 1982 Y Fuchs, Ernst 1930 –
Wlodarski, Marek 1903 1960 Bodmer, Walter 1903 1973
Wojnarowicz, David 1954 1992 Y Frize, Bernard 1954 –
Woodman, Francesca 1958 1981 Wiszniewski, Adrian 1958 –
Wunuwun, Jack 1930 1990 Jaimes Sanchez, Humberto 1930 2003
Zabaleta, Rafael 1907 1960 Yunapingu, Munggurrawuy 1907 1979
Zobel, Fernando 1924 1984 Morellet, Francois 1926 2016
Zverev, Anatoly 1931 1986 Opalka, Roman 1931 2011
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